By Richard Haass, CFR
Richard N. Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed are solely those of the author. This edition of First Take originally appeared here.
The Russian and Chinese veto of the U.N. Security Council draft resolution that would have declared the situation in Syria a threat to international peace and security, extended the U.N. diplomatic mission headed by Kofi Annan, and set the stage for new sanctions and possibly U.N.-authorized military action was hardly surprising. More important, it isn’t all that significant.
What explains the veto is not just Russia’s and China’s opposition to the use of military force to unseat the Assad regime, something which would have required another Security Council resolution in any event. They also are uneasy with anything that legitimizes international involvement in what they see as the domestic affairs of countries. Both the Russian and Chinese governments fear precedents that could be turned against them. By contrast, the United States and many others believe outsiders have a responsibility to act if governments mistreat their citizens. If nothing else, it’s time for a moratorium on the use of the phrase “international community” in situations such as this one where no such consensus exists.
The vote in New York won’t materially affect the situation on the ground. The Syrian government has lost control over important parts of the country, and the opposition has demonstrated an ability to strike successfully in Damascus. Fighting is likely to intensify; the opposition will want to build on the momentum of this week’s successful bombing; the Assad regime will want to demonstrate it is still able to defeat any and all challenges.
The failure to renew the diplomatic mission being led by Kofi Annan (with its associated group of observers) is no great loss. The peace plan under which Annan was operating had – and has – no chance of being accepted. It would be far better to terminate this effort and establish a new one with the mission of bringing about the exit of the current Syrian regime.
Last, the United States and other like-minded governments shouldn’t equate the United Nations with multilateralism, nor should they see the U.N. as having a monopoly on legitimacy. To the contrary, they should form a coalition of the willing and able, composed of NATO countries, selected Arab governments, and others that are committed to increasing sanctions against not just Syria but those countries supporting it, building up the strength and political appeal of the Syrian opposition, pressing for war crimes indictments against Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle, planning for strikes against Syrian chemical munitions, and preparing for a post-Assad Syria.
As hard as it is proving to bring about the regime’s downfall, it will likely prove far harder to manage a transition to something stable and democratic.